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Analysing security subcomplexes in a changing
Middle East—the role of non-Arab state actors and
non-state actors
Peter Seeberg1
ABSTRACT This article presents a theoretical framework for a collection of articles
(“special issue”), which aims at discussing the role of non-Arab state actors and non-state
actors in a changing Middle East. The articles in the collection offer perspectives that have
been overlooked in recent research, namely those focusing on the role of non-Arab state
actors and non-state actors in connection with the changing security environment in the
region. Furthermore, these articles discuss how changes in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region are appearing in different and shifting contexts in the creation of new local,
sub-regional, or regional security subcomplexes in which Arab states, non-Arab states and
non-state actors enter into new conﬂicts, alliances and other political relations with and
against each other. The role of international actors interfering in the region is also analyzed in
the context of the changing Middle East.
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Introduction
The articles appearing in this special issue take upperspectives that to some degree have been overlooked inrecent research, namely those focused on the role of non-
Arab state actors and non-state actors in connection with the
changing security environment in the Middle East region. Where
much of the research on the Arab uprisings in 2011 and onwards
ﬁrst of all have analysed the Arab states and their regional and
international relations (Dalacoura, 2012; Sekkat, 2014; Al-Sumait
et al., 2015; Brownlee et al., 2015; Butenschøn, 2015; Heydemann,
2016; Seeberg, 2016a), this collection of articles takes its point of
departure in the role of non-Arab states and non-state actors
during the years after the revolts. The articles discuss the
changing security environment in the Middle East region and
analyses the role of Iran, Israel and Turkey as signiﬁcant foreign
policy and security actors in the Middle East. Located in
geographical proximity to Iraq and Syria they are affected by
the ongoing crisis there, at the same time as they in different ways
contribute to the regional development (Aran, 2012; Phillips,
2012; Ehteshami et al., 2013). Related to the complex role of the
non-Arab states in the region, a number of important non-state
actors are also inﬂuencing the recent turmoil in the Middle East.
This is the case for well-known actors like Hezbollah and Hamas,
but also for organizations that have more recently entered the
political scene, like Islamic State (IS, or Da’esh) (Milton-Edwards,
2013; Juneau, 2015).
More than half a decade after the start of the Arab uprisings,
the Middle East is in a state of turmoil. In some states political
transformations are still unfolding, while in other states ongoing
internal conﬂicts, if not wars, are taking place. The complex
developments have resulted in reconﬁgurations of the balance of
power and a negatively inﬂuenced security situation. The critical
realities in several states in the region affect, as shown in the
Routledge Handbook on the Arab Spring, the overall political
conditions and create unstable security environments locally, in
regional subsystems, and in the broader Middle East perspective
(Sadiki, 2015).
The in many ways surprising developments in the Arab states
have attracted much academic focus, partly because they
demonstrate that the existing political order was after all less
stable than the dominant narrative of authoritarian resilience had
it. As emphasized by Fawaz Gerges, no single cause can explain
the social eruptions that shook the Arab world in particular in
early 2011. A complex set of drivers need to be brought forward
to capture the overthrow of several of the authoritarian rulers
(Gerges, 2014: 9–15). At the same time, phenomena such as social
movements, the new and the old media, the role of the armies, and
so forth, which inﬂuenced both the start and the outcome of the
uprisings, need to be thoroughly analysed to understand the
changing realities of the Middle East (Al-Sumait et al., 2015;
Seeberg, 2015a). The articles also discuss how changes in the
Middle East region are appearing in different and shifting contexts
in the creation of new local, sub-regional, or regional security
complexes in which non-Arab states and non-state actors enter
into new conﬂicts, alliances, and other political relations with and
against each other. The articles discuss, from the perspectives of
non-Arab state actors and non-state actors, challenges related to
the understanding and analysis of how the ongoing transformation
processes in the Middle East have affected existing security
subcomplexes, thereby contributing to the discussions of possible
changes in the existing state system in the Middle East and in
particular in the Levant (Beck et al., 2016a).
It is the ambition of this introductory article both to highlight
the contributions of the collection and to explain the subjects
addressed. This article brieﬂy traces the history of the emergence
of Middle Eastern security subcomplexes, taking its starting point
in the situation after World War II, where the wave of
decolonisation contributed to the formation of the Middle East
region. The Arab states developed into authoritarian regimes,
which for decades seemed unmoveable, but as transformation
processes appeared in connection with the Arab uprisings, a
changing Middle East seemed to defy our perception of stability
and resilience. This article shows that the non-Arab states and the
non-state actors in the region are not passive bystanders while
these historical processes take place. Rather they play important
roles in the transitions and inﬂuence or intervene in the
developments, directly or indirectly.
The emergence of Middle Eastern security subcomplexes. In
order to discuss the speciﬁc role of the non-Arab actors and the
non-state actors in connection with the ongoing transformations
in a security perspective, this introduction will take its point of
departure in the notion of regional security subcomplexes, coined
by the so-called Copenhagen school. Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver
describe in their seminal work Regions and Powers: The Structure
of International Security how a regional security complex appears
in the Middle East in the years after World War II (Buzan and
Wæver, 2003). They note how several of the recent conﬂicts have
roots reaching back before the war, such as the ﬁght for leader-
ship between Arab states (Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria) and
the Israel-Palestine conﬂict. Added to that, British and French
inﬂuence via the mandate system is strongly felt, in the sense that
“their military-political overlay dominated the region” (Buzan
and Wæver, 2003). However, after 1945 and the wave of deco-
lonization following the war, a critical mass of independent states
generated the Middle Eastern regional security complex.
Gradually three subcomplexes emerged, two of which centred
in the Mashreq and the Gulf, with a less signiﬁcant one in the
Maghreb. A deﬁning aspect of the Mashreq subcomplex has
without doubt been the conﬂict between the Palestinians and
Israel, with its long row of wars involving Israel’s neighbouring
Arab states and also several signiﬁcant non-state actors. As
underlined by Shlaim (2014: 383), Palestine is for ordinary people
in the Arab world not just a political issue, but an identity issue.
The Palestinians are engaged in what perhaps can be seen as the
last anticolonial struggle in the world, and the cause of Palestine
“remains suffused in symbolism that transcends the narrow
borders of its patrimony” (Shlaim, 2014: 384). In this sense the
Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict has ampliﬁed and focused transna-
tional dimensions of Arab nationalism, thereby contributing to
the coherence of the Middle East as a regional security complex.
The coherence of the Middle East can be questioned, as it was
in the well-known work Middle East Dilemma by Michael
Hudson et al. analysing the (lack of) Arab integration. However,
rather than only emphasizing disintegration, Hudson et al.
mentioned some of the dimensions of the economic integration
in parts of the Middle East, for instance the “logic of integration”
attached to the economic development and social modernization
of the states constituting the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC),
which “generated a vast movement of labor and remittances
across borders” (Hudson, 1999: 2). However, the very existence of
factors like that does not, as pointed out by Valbjørn (2016),
automatically lead to increased integration. Rather the signiﬁcant
internal migratory movements in the Middle East indirectly
emphasize one of the important reasons for the lack of unity: the
huge differences in GDP per capita between the rich Gulf states
and the poor Arab states like Egypt, Morocco and Yemen (Zank,
2009).
The Gulf states, together with Iran and Iraq, constitute a
security subcomplex formed after the British withdrawal in the
early 1970s and based on a triangular rivalry between Iran, Iraq
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and the GCC states led by Saudi Arabia (Buzan and Wæver, 2003:
191). The rivalry was sharpened in the late 1970s by the arrival of
the new Shia Muslim regime in Teheran. Interestingly enough the
religious regime established a strong alliance with secular Syria,
which for a long time stemmed from a common interest in
containing an aggressive Iraq. In response to the establishment of
the Islamic Republic of Iran, and especially in order to strengthen
themselves against any possible negative consequences of the
1980–1988 Iran–Iraq war, the Arab Gulf states launched the GCC
in 1981 as what might be described as a defensive alliance
(Ehteshami et al. 1991; Fawcett, 2005). Generally speaking the
Middle East was never one regional community, but rather a
system of sub-regional security complexes, only rarely having
identical or even just common interests.
Turkey has become a signiﬁcant actor in the Arab world,
especially in recent years, where the AKP-led Turkish govern-
ment pursued an activist policy vis-à-vis the Middle East (Park,
2014). In the wording of the Copenhagen school, Turkey can be
perceived as an insulator, deﬁned as a “location occupied by one
or more units where larger regional security dynamics stand back
to back” (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 41). The notion of Turkey as
an insulator is useful for the overall analysis of the foreign policy
of Turkey, but in particular toward the Middle East, as will be
seen later (Barrinha, 2013). The understanding of the Middle East
as consisting of regional security subcomplexes supplemented by
insulators should obviously not be perceived as a once and for all
given and unchangeable analytical set of tools. The framework
should rather contribute to perceiving a Middle East in
transformation, where shifting alliances, regime changes and
external inﬂuence form new challenges for our analytical
instruments.
The transformation of the Middle East and the role of the non-
Arab state actors. Since the start of the Arab revolts in late 2010
and the beginning of 2011, several states in the Arab world have
been going through a transformation process that in some way or
another has challenged the old order, the resilient authoritarian
Middle Eastern states (Seeberg, 2015b). The process has been
inﬂuenced by external actors and international actors (the United
States, the EU), as well as regional state actors and non-state
actors. Among the non-state actors, it is worth mentioning that
tendencies toward a more active role for regional organizations
like the League of Arab States (Arab League) seem to be a reality
(Beck, 2015; Seeberg, 2015c). Added to that, non-Arab state
actors have inﬂuenced the transformation processes. In the
Mashreq security subcomplex, ﬁrst of all Israel has played a role,
in particular in relation to its Palestinian counterparts, the PNA
and the Hamas, but also toward its Arab neighbouring states
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria (Allegra and Napolitano, 2011).
This has been the case within the framework of the Mashreq
subcomplex, but maybe more signiﬁcantly in connection with the
Gulf subcomplex, where Iran, Israel and Turkey have posed their
own, different agendas.
The Islamic Republic of Iran pursues an ambitious foreign and
security policy, via the Hezbollah focusing on the Mashreq
security subcomplex and in an intense competition with Saudi
Arabia (and to some degree Iraq) inﬂuencing the Gulf
subcomplex (Maloney, 2015). In the former context, Iran has
attempted to utilize its close connections to the Hezbollah to
contest Israeli dominance and, again primarily via the Hezbollah,
to participate in the civil war in Syria. The traditional alliance
with Syria is thereby maintained, but also given new dimensions
via the confrontations with the “new enemies,” Sunni Muslim IS.
The competition with the GCC states, involving the Iranian
nuclear issue, is inter alia about dominance in the Persian Gulf,
but has signiﬁcant perspectives beyond the subcomplex-context.
The nuclear issue plays into the Iran–Israel rivalry and involves
important international dimensions, because of the years of
confrontations between Iran and the UN in this respect. The
nuclear question led to multi- and bilateral sanctions against Iran,
not least severe sanctions from the United States and the EU,
which without doubt created problems for the regime in Teheran
and contributed to the decision to change signals from the side of
Iran (Bazoobandi, 2015; Bergeijk, 2015).
By taking advantage of the widespread view in Iran that the
sanctions were an expression of interference in Iranian internal
affairs, Iran paradoxically (and successfully) practiced what
Steven Heydemann and Reinoud Leenders has termed “recombi-
nant authoritarianism”, understood as “systems of rule that
possess the capacity to reorder and reconﬁgure instruments and
strategies of governance, to reshape and recombine existing
institutional, discursive, and regulatory arrangements to create
recognizable but nonetheless distinctive solutions to shifting
conﬁgurations of challenges” (Heydemann and Leenders, 2013:
7). In pursuing the same agenda Iran attempted to diversify its
international links, albeit with only moderate success (Ehteshami
et al., 2013: 236). In the context of the Gulf subcomplex, the
Islamic Republic is playing an important role in the sectarian
confrontations internally in Iraq, where the Shia Muslims
constitute the largest majority, but where the remnants of many
years of Sunni political and economic dominance contribute to a
highly fragile security environment, lately inﬂuenced very much
by the IS as a signiﬁcant player in the destabilizing internal
conﬂicts in Iraq.
The article by Peter Seeberg in this collection analyses the
complex relationship between the sanctions imposed on Iran and
the political development over the recent years regarding the
Levant and Gulf security subsystems—with a focus on EU–Iran
relations (Seeberg, 2016b). What Thomas Juneau has referred to
as Iran’s “strategic loneliness” (Juneau 2014) might be a reality,
but still Iran has been able to pursue foreign and security policy
interests—both in the Levant and in the Gulf. The article ﬁrstly
discusses the signiﬁcance of the sanctions in inﬂuencing the
Iranian decisions on the nuclear issue; secondly, how the
imposing of the sanctions affected European–Iranian relations;
and, thirdly, the Iranian ability to pursue its policies in the two
regional subcomplexes. To carry out the analysis the article
describes phases in the sanctions against Iran from the establish-
ment of the sanctions regime to the ﬁnal agreement was reached
in 2015. In the ﬁrst phase the EU attempted, via a soft power
strategy, to go after negotiated solutions. The strategy was
successful; in the Paris-agreement Iran consented to freezing of
enrichment in return for trade and technology beneﬁts. After
being elected in 2005 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad initiated a period
of confrontation—announcing that Iran would start enriching its
plutonium. The EU and the other international sanctioning states
imposed additional sanctions. In this second phase, however,
some states in the alliance against Iran’s nuclear policies
expressed reservations regarding taking part in the oil embargo
against Iran—so potential divisions between the sanctioning
states were revealed. In a third phase the EU measures were
tightened and included individual sanctions hitting Iranian
ofﬁcials responsible for human rights violations. In a fourth
and last phase before the agreement of July 2015 an oil embargo
was implemented, which seriously affected the Iranian economy
and probably deﬁnitively convinced the Iranian regime that it
would be wise to enter a deal with the sanctioning powers?
With the ﬁfth phase, a post-agreement period was initiated,
which in principle is still ongoing. It has, throughout the long
process been the ofﬁcial Iranian position, that it never had plans
of constructing nuclear weapons. Nevertheless both Israel and the
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Gulf-states, and in particular Saudi-Arabia, have seen the Iranian
nuclear policies as threatening. The issue has signiﬁcant strategic
implications. Israel has argued strongly against making agree-
ments with Iran regarding the nuclear issue, fearing that a nuclear
capability would add new dimensions to the encircling of Israel
through the Iranian connections with Syria, Hezbollah and
Hamas. Saudi-Arabia ofﬁcially supported the negotiations in
Vienna, but in reality the Saudis were sceptical, because they
feared that an agreement would result in a situation, where Iran
could maintain (parts of) their nuclear programme, thus having a
strategic edge vis-à-vis Saudi-Arabia. The commonality of interest
in re-establishing trade relations between Iran and the interna-
tional actors in the West, in particular the United States and the
EU, potentially might turn out to be a signiﬁcant factor for future
cooperation. Given a lifting of the oil-embargo Iran and the GCC-
states compete in the strategically important global oil-market.
Summing up Seeberg demonstrates that the role of Iran in the
Levant and the Gulf changed over the decade leading up to the
agreement in Vienna. Iran used to be a strong actor in both
subcomplexes, but gradually a relative weakening became a
reality, especially in the context of the Gulf. In the Levant things
are more complex. The emerging crisis in Syria (and the
close relations between Syria and Iran) in the ﬁrst place
constituted an obstacle for improving Iran’s relations with the
EU. However, the arrival of the IS on the political and military
scene added to the complexity—ﬁrst of all because Iran and the
EU have common interests in controlling and rolling back the IS,
and in this perspective the continued Iranian support for the
regime in Damascus might no longer, seen from Brussels, be that
important.
As mentioned by Shlaim (2014: 385), both Israel and the US
initially perceived the Arab revolts more as a problem than a
prospect. The uprisings in some ways came as an unpleasant
surprise for the Israeli leaders, who always reiterated that peace
and security were dependent on Arab regime changes in a
democratic direction. There was some speculation if the Camp
David Accords of 1978–1979 would be in danger following the
regime changes in Egypt since the fall of Hosni Mubarak, but
after the coup in July 2013 that brought Abdul Fatah al-Sisi to
power, the threat seems irrelevant. The Israeli reaction to the
establishment of a Fatah–Hamas unity government in 2014 and
the attempts from the Palestinian side to obtain recognition in the
UN in 2015 emphasize that the conﬂict is still far from ﬁnding a
solution. The type of warfare in connection with the Israeli action
in Gaza in the summer of 2014, the so-called Operation
Protective Edge, with several thousand killed and more than
10,000 wounded, leaves no doubt that Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s “Iron
Wall” doctrine from the 1920s (Shlaim, 2000) still forms the basis
for the Israeli security strategy.
The article by Beck (2016) takes up this perspective by
discussing how the Arab uprisings were perceived in Israel and
how Israel—in terms of political communication and rhetoric—
presented the political developments in the international public
sphere. It is an important point in the article that there has been a
discrepancy between the rhetoric by the Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu, who portrayed the uprisings as anti-Israeli
and the actual realities, where the revolts against the Arab leaders
in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and so on. despite some destabilizing
potential hardly represented serious security threats for the Israeli
state. It is the idea of the article to analyse and discuss how a wait
and see approach at the level of realpolitik is contrasted by an
ofﬁcial characterization of the Arab uprisings as constituting
major security threats for Israel.
The article presents a theoretical framework, where neo-
realism, institutionalism, liberalism and the securitization
approach as invented by the Copenhagen School are applied.
Beck shows that from a neo-realist analytical perspective, the
Arab uprisings did not trigger major changes in Israel’s power
position in the Middle East. And apart from some minor
incidents at the Israeli border and at Israeli embassies abroad,
Israel has not had to face signiﬁcant threats. Furthermore Beck
notices that the newcomer in the Levant, IS, having carried out
attacks on Muslim Christians, Yazidis and Kurds, has not
included Jewish Israel in its atrocities. The Institutionalist
perspective of the analysis takes its starting point in that the
Middle East region is characterized by a low level of regional
coherence, not to say cooperation—and that Israel’s integration
into regional organizations and agreements is particularly low.
However, experiences since 2011 related to the Arab uprisings do
not indicate that any major agreement with neighbouring states
(like for instance the Camp David accord with Egypt or the peace
agreement of 1994 with Jordan) have been challenged following
the uprisings. In recent years, as mentioned by Beck, Egypt under
Abdel Fatah al-Sisi has even increased the cooperation with Israel
—in order to put pressure on Hamas. Regarding the liberalist
aspects of the analysis the classical democracy theorem does not
really ﬁt with the actual realities in the case of the Arab uprisings.
Developments inherent in transformation processes during which
regimes tend to resort to aggressive foreign policies, which
enables them to distract from deﬁcits in their performance in
domestic politics, seems hardly to be a relevant perspective. Israel
is therefore left with a pragmatic “wait and see” approach to the
recent realities in the Middle East.
The analysis of Israel’s role in connection with the Arab
uprisings points to a paradox, where the calm wait and see policy
contradicts the rhetoric of the Israeli leaders. The security
dimension can help making sense of this contradiction. The
concept of occupation provides the empirical link, which helps
making the paradox understandable. According to Beck “Israels
response to the Arab uprisings: securitizing the “Arab Spring”
contributed to Israel’s ability to maintain its position as an
integral member of the “civilized” (Western) community”.
Securitizing the Arab revolts contributes to legitimizing the
extraordinary measures of occupation—and to counteract
normative pressures on Israel’s policies vis-à-vis its Palestinian
neighbours in Gaza and the West Bank.
Turkey stands out in connection with the dynamics of the
Mashreq and Gulf regional security subcomplexes as something
of a special case. Turkey might, as explained by Ziya Öniş, have
presented an over-ambitious foreign policy in connection with
the challenges from the Arab world and Israel in the last 5 years.
Turkish policies changed as a result of internal reconﬁgurations
of power, where the AKP-led government has been successful in a
gradual outmanoeuvring of the earlier, very powerful Turkish
military and also the Kemalist bureaucracy (Ayoob, 2014).
Instead the Middle East became the centre of attention: “With
the rising tide of conservatism and a rediscovery of the Ottoman
past in Turkish politics, it was perhaps inevitably that the Muslim
in general and the Arab world in particular, would occupy centre
stage in Turkish foreign policy”(Öniş, 2014: 207). Seen from the
side of the Turkish insulator the Arab world, to paraphrase Buzan
and Wæver, became part of the security dynamics standing back
to back.
In the case of Syria, Turkey ended up on the opposite side to
Iran. Whereas Iran stood by its historical alliance with the Syrian
regime, Turkey, after some initial hesitation, took a ﬁrm stand
together with the Syrian opposition—and even, after a while,
established its own sanctions programme against Syria, similar to
the United States and the EU (Seeberg, 2016a). Turkey thus
intervened in the Mashreq security subcomplex, taking the same
side as the international powers, the United States and the EU,
and with similar means, all the while its more confrontational
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policy against Israel became less problematic for the United
States. In the case of Iran, Turkey decided to insist on Iran’s right
to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes. This was partly based
on a pragmatic foreign policy viewpoint, taking care of Turkey’s
economic interests in trading with Iran, but also based on well-
calculated statements catering for the “Arab Street”, where for
instance the then Prime Minister Abdullah Gül made this
statement: “We are categorically opposed to the presence of
weapons of mass destructions in our region … we have always
called for the establishment of a WMD free zone in the Middle
East, including both Iran and Israel”. (Ayoob, 2014: 414)
Taking his point of departure in the Copenhagen school
concepts of regional security complexes and the role of insulators
André Barrinha discusses “whether it is possible for Turkey to
become an international power while remaining an insulator
state”, (Barrinha, 2013: 167)—and answers that this, rather than
being a reality, seems more to be a project for a possible future.
Turkey has ambitious plans about being one of the world’s
strongest economies, and being among the sixteen largest
economies in the world, there is hardly doubt that Turkey has
a huge potential. Its role as an insulator, however, is highly
challenging, not least in security environments like the ones
surrounding Turkey. Being in a geostrategic position like that,
Turkey has to function in relation to the security dynamics
present in both the Mashreq and the Gulf security subcomplexes
—and at the same time take its relations to EU (and the United
States) seriously. The Arab revolts have not made this an easier
task and the confrontations, sometimes even very close to Turkish
borders, between the IS, Kurdish Peshmerga militias, the PKK
and other groups, including units from the Syrian army, only add
to the foreign and security policy challenges facing Turkey
(Lawson, 2016). There is hardly doubt that Turkey, as indicated
by Özden Zeynep Oktav and Aycan Çelikaksoy, to some degree
has felt isolated and betrayed by both the US and the EU, both
pursuing a hesitant approach towards the crisis in Syria, both
when it comes to military actions and helping taking care of the
Syrian refugees, constituting logistic as well as security related
problems for Turkey (Oktav and Çelikaksoy, 2015).
In his analysis of Turkey’s domestic politics and Middle East
policy Hale (2016) focuses on how Turkish foreign policy
often has been affected by domestic divisions. Hale discusses
three categories: ﬁrst, historically determined cultural and ethnic
cleavages, second, public opinion on foreign policy issues, and
third, domestic policy considerations with foreign policy
implications. Initially Hale characterizes signiﬁcant traits of
Turkish political culture, starting with Kemal Atatürk’s reforms
in the 1920s establishing Turkey as a secular state in Anatolia,
being the central area in what used to be a multinational Islamic
Ottoman empire. The empire included large parts of the Arab
world and by cutting the link between the state and Islam, the
new state was, in effect, aiming at ending main cultural and
historical bonds between Turks and Arabs. According to Hale the
ofﬁcial Turkish discourse sought to de-Arabise the Muslim
culture and history—rather than excluding the Turks from it.
Furthermore the Ottoman defeat in the First World War led to
the understanding that Turkey should avoid involvement in the
Arab region.
Hale points to a phenomenon labelled “neo-Ottomanism”,
which since the 1980s has helped to re-habilitate the Ottoman
past, without saying much about its negative aspects. In two
phases this new tendency became obvious, ﬁrst in connection
with the Cold War, where Turkey gradually aimed at devel-
oping closer relations to countries in its neighbourhood. These
countries, primarily located in the Balkans and in the Middle
East, used to be Ottoman territory. Secondly following the
elections in November 2002 Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu
argued that Turkey should give up its defensive attitudes towards
its surroundings and pursue a much more active foreign policy.
Davutoğlu rejected the label “neo-Ottomanism”, but launched
a policy, which in the years preceding the Arab uprisings,
improved the Turkish relations to a number of states in the Arab
region and to other actors in its surroundings. The emerging
crisis in Syria, however, led to more complex foreign policy and in
some cases to difﬁcult challenges, not least because of the
problematic relations between Turkey and the Kurdish organiza-
tions PKK and PYD, which particularly in the ﬁght against IS
became important actors. Furthermore the relations between
Turkey and Russia suffered from the very different strategic
positions vis-à-vis Syria. The general public in Turkey gradually
became more critical against Turkey being too involved in the
turmoil in the Middle East. Hale demonstrates how opinion polls
became more negative than earlier under the AKP-dominated
foreign policies and more speciﬁcally against participation in
direct intervention in Syria, should that become a realistic
perspective. The lack of public support for the foreign policy
strategies has affected the Turkish leaders and contributed to a
downgrading of the activist element in the policies. According to
Hale “it was hard to escape the impression, that most of the
Davutoğlu doctrine had been quietly dropped, in the face of the
multitude of problems it faced, but without a clear replacement”.
The critical situation with the continued Syrian crisis and the
difﬁculties in rolling back the IS in both Syria and Iraq, and added
to that, the resulting huge number of Syrian refugees in Turkey,
inﬂuenced the domestic political debates and strengthened the
opposition in its criticism of the AKP leaders. The domestic
political issues thus continued having a crucial effect on foreign
relations—and vice versa: the in many ways problematic
developments in the Levant played an important role in
inﬂuencing Turkish politics.
The crisis in the Middle East and the role of the non-state
actors. From 2014 and onwards the optimism attached to the
Arab uprisings in the Middle East in early 2011 was replaced by a
negative sentiment. The transformative logic that seemed to fol-
low the changes from a relatively homogeneous Arab world
characterized by conservative authoritarian regimes in different
forms to a repoliticized Arab world in democratic progress
developed into heterogeneous scenarios which leave behind an
impression of crisis and anarchy. The authoritarian state
in the region is certainly not dead; indeed in some states it is
strengthened by rentier-state mechanisms and by fear of
importing the chaos and anarchy in the states in turmoil
(Anderson, 2014).
In this troubled reality, a number of important non-state actors
are playing an increasingly signiﬁcant role. Organizations like
Hamas, Hezbollah, IS, Jabhat al-Nusra (from July 2016 Jabhat
Fatah al-Sham), PKK, and PYD are all examples of strong and
well-organized political entities that are taking part in the
ongoing political and, in some cases, military developments and
confrontations. The organizations have different goals and
sometimes it may not be the ambition to capture the state as
such, but to take part in the contestation for inﬂuence within
given national borders. Sometimes the organizations have a partly
transnational perspective, as it obviously is the case with the IS
and the Hezbollah, as shown by Aran (2012). In other cases, they
are speciﬁcally local and/or national, as in the case of religious-
political parties or organizations like, for instance, the al-‘Asîr
movement and the Anti-Sectarian Movement in Lebanon, as
analysed by Meier (2015).
Some non-state actors are part of political and/or military
alliances, as for instance Hezbollah, which has been a signiﬁcant,
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if not dominant, organization in Lebanon since the ﬁrst half of
the 1980s (Norton, 2007a, b). From the start, both Syria and Iran
shared support for the Lebanese movement, but it soon became
clear that Iran held the main responsibility for the development of
the organization. The active alliances with signiﬁcant state actors
contribute to the relative isolation of Israel, and the necessity of
bolstering the power of the Iran–Hezbollah–Syria axis, which is
an important theme in Israeli foreign policy (Guzansky, 2014:
99). Hezbollah is not only a political party or a strong militia.
The organization or movement also organizes a wide range of
social activities of a semi-state character, runs a huge media
conglomerate of which the satellite television station Al Manar
may be the most signiﬁcant element, and has over the last
years invested its soldiers, military equipment, and political
reputation in ﬁghting for the Ba’athist regime in Damascus—to
an increasing degree against another signiﬁcant non-state actor,
the IS (Al Jazeera, 2015).
The complex character of Hezbollah, with its political, social,
military, and public sphere dimensions, can also be seen in
connection with other organizations or movements. Hamas has
been and still is part of the political leadership in the context of the
Palestinian territories, Gaza and the West Bank. The history of
Hamas is in some ways similar to that of Hezbollah. Hamas
emerged out of the ﬁrst Intifada and soon became a powerful
movement within the Palestinian territories (Milton-Edwards and
Farrell, 2010). Their violent campaigns against Israel have resulted
in several hundred casualties, among whom have been Israeli
soldiers, settlers, civilians, and sometimes tourists and immigrant
workers. Hamas held the undisputed leadership of Gaza for years
until this was handed over to the unity government in June 2014.
Organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah play, with their complex
structures and manifold societal functions, in some ways roles
similar to states, and their political and social signiﬁcance in the
Mashreq subcomplex are considerable.
The formation of the unity government in Palestine in June
2014 was the wish of many ordinary Palestinians (Ibish, 2014).
Nevertheless, its history became short as it only lasted 1 year. The
wider phases planned, namely the holding of presidential and
parliamentary elections 6 months after the signing of the unity
government agreement, never became a reality. It seems that one
of the effects of the Arab uprisings regarding the Palestinian
leadership has been to strengthen tendencies toward reconcilia-
tion and the promotion of PLO reforms in the West Bank
(Tuastad, 2013: 96). Furthermore, the Syrian crisis has challenged
the Hamas leaders, who before the Arab uprisings moved to
Damascus. This happened already in 1999, after the expulsion of
Hamas’ leaders from their Amman ofﬁces. Bashar al-Assad, who
came to power in 2000, allowed Hamas to carry out mobilization
and propaganda campaigns in Palestinian camps in Syria, so
initially the Hamas-Syria link was strengthened.
However, as the uprisings in Syria developed into a civil war,
the relationship cooled down, not least when Hamas, as part of a
gradual change of strategy in Syria, went through a “rapproche-
ment with Egypt, Jordan and Qatar, which it had initiated in an
attempt to ﬁnd an alternative base for its leaders in case the
strategic relationship with Syria were broken” (Napolitano, 2013:
76). This became something of a self-fulﬁlling prophecy. The
relations between Syria and Hamas deteriorated resulting in
Hamas leaving Damascus, as pointed at by Milton-Edwards
(2013: 64). Meetings between Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran took
place emphasizing the importance of the non-state actors in the
Mashreq subcomplex, and in connection with this a relative
weakening of Syria in the context of foreign and security policy
occurred (Seeberg, 2013).
In a recent perspective the emergence of the radical Islamist
organizations IS and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham is adding to the
weakening of the Syrian regime is. These organizations are taking
part in the ﬁghting in the Mashreq security subcomplex, ﬁrst of
all in Syria, but to some degree also in the Gulf subcomplex,
mainly in Iraq, and in the Maghreb subcomplex, primarily in
northern Libya (Buckley, 2012). IS considers itself to be a post-
state entity, superseding Westphalian deﬁnitions of a state—by
claiming to have established a trans-state caliphate in Syria and
Iraq (Gunter, 2015: 102). Its efﬁciency and military capabilities
taken into consideration, IS causes severe problems for the
Syrian regime—and for the international actors, not least the
United States. The United States is caught in a difﬁcult position
with its relations to several of the actors involved in the recent
turmoil in the Levant and the Gulf subcomplexes. Partly for
reasons of its close relations (via NATO) with Turkey, the United
States has had some difﬁculties in appreciating the efforts
by the PKK in ﬁghting IS. It is part of the complicated story,
that not only the Kurdish Peshmerga are ﬁghting IS, but
also the PKK and the PYD militants, blurring both the
alliances and the contradictions between the non-Arab state
actors, the non-state actors, and the international actors as well
(Gunter, 2015).
It adds signiﬁcantly to the complexity of the role of the non-
state actors, as emphasized by Berti (2016), that “organizations
like Hamas or Hezbollah operate simultaneously as sophisticated
armed organizations, complex political entities and as highly
developed social movement organizations involved in adminis-
tering and delivering social services at the grassroots level”. The
idea of her article is to analyse how some non-state actors (like
the above-mentioned, but also IS) seem to develop alternative
forms of governance, which even represent high degrees of
autonomy from the state—and, as it for instance has been the case
with Hezbollah in Lebanon, sometimes competing with it.
The article focuses on IS, Hezbollah and Hamas—obviously
three different organizations, whose, as mentioned by Berti,
diversity should not be under-stated. Where IS can be described
as an anti-systemic actor pursuing a transnational (or post-
national) agenda, Hezbollah is something completely different: a
highly cohesive and institutionalized organization, which plays an
important role in Lebanese politics, has an advanced and well-
functioning network and a very strong military apparatus. Hamas
represents, according to Berti, something in between, with its
extra-institutional socio-political movement and a political party,
which in reality rules in Gaza—and for many years has remained
highly involved in Palestine’s political life. This is of course very
different from the IS, which has proclaimed the Caliphate in areas
in Iraq and Syria, with their own state institutions and managing
of resources, security and delivery of social services. Berti makes
the point, that regarding the three non-state armed groups
analysed, many of their social, political governance related
activities are not much different from those performed by “real”
states. Furthermore she shows how what she calls “rebel
governance” endows the organizations with some level of effective
sovereignty, enforcing control over a speciﬁc territory and its
population(s). Upholding this sovereignty requires a combination
of coercion and co-optation, which is made possible through the
provision of security, social service and more or less voluntary
cooperation between the political leadership and the population
in the given territory. The armed groups applies discursive and
symbolic policies in order to create a kind of legitimacy, which
emphasizes that “rebel governance” blurs the line between “state”
and “non-state”. By analysing and discussing Hamas, Hezbollah
and IS “the article deconstructs the main heuristic devises used to
frame the debate on non-state armed groups”, thereby arguing
“for the importance of coming to terms with the increasing
complexity and diversity of these actors and for applying a more
nuanced and holistic framework”.
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Concluding remarks
In summary, it seems obvious that the ongoing political and
social transformations in the Middle East regional security
complex have changed the conditions for the non-Arab state
actors Iran, Israel and Turkey, and the non-state actors Hamas,
Hezbollah, IS and so on. in pursuing their foreign- and security-
policy interests. At the same time, the opposite is the case: in
complex dialectical processes the non-Arab state actors and non-
state actors have played and play signiﬁcant roles affecting in
particular the Mashreq and Gulf security subcomplexes, thereby
inﬂuencing the overall political development of the Middle East
following the Arab uprisings in 2011. For the purpose of
analysing both change and continuity in the Mashreq and Gulf
regional security subcomplexes over the recent years, the non-
Arab actors and the non-state actors are highly important, if not
indispensable. By focusing on these speciﬁc dimensions of the
complex Middle Eastern reality, this collection of articles hopes to
present a signiﬁcant contribution to our understanding of the
region’s recent development.
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